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Abstract

Matteo Salvini is the former Deputy Prime Minister, and former Minister of the Interior of Italy. Born in Milan, Salvini joined and
quickly rose up the ranks of the Young Padanians Movement, a political youth group associated with the newly formed Lega Nord
political party. Now, Salvini sits on the throne of La Lega, as the party’s secretary and chairman.i Not only is Salvini the formal
party leader, but he has also shown himself to be extremely popular on social media – using his Twitter account to rabble-rouse,
organize, and grandstand. While Salvini’s xenophobic and anti-statist rhetoric is certainly worth investigation in its own right, to
best understand Salvini’s meteoric rise one has to first understand the party he leads. Accordingly, this paper focuses on three
overarching aspects of La Lega: its history, its ideology, and the effects of globalization on the party.

INTRODUCTION

to be secessionist, and it was nationalist when it paid to be
nationalist.

The Lega Nord, as it’s today known, emerged onto the

This paper furthermore attempts to classify the

political scene in the mid ’80s as an unknown party vaguely

ideology of La Lega. With shifts in platform come

dedicated to localist policies. In the years that followed, La Lega

corresponding shifts in ideas, and La Lega is no exception. But

gained an enormous amount of momentum, bringing political

there are certain undercurrents, like anti-statism, ethno-

scientists and activists into the fold whoZ helped the party

regionalism and welfare chauvinism that remain constant

articulate a clear ideology, and allowed it to expand its influence

throughout the party’s life. La Lega began by lofting scathing

from provincial Northern cities to entire regions.ii By the time

critiques against the Italian central government, which it argued,

La Lega won its first major electoral victory in the 1992 Italian

was suffocating the Italian regions with high taxes, supporting a

general election, it was a well-oiled machine that stood for

welfare state for the South of Italy (the money for which went

federalism, ethno-regionalism, and neoliberal economics. The

right into the pockets of the mafia), and engaging in

party went through one more significant ideological pivot in

unprecedented racketeering.iii Indeed, in the late ’80s, La Lega

2013 – incidentally, when Salvini took over as secretary – to

was the only party calling out the Italian government for its

broaden its appeal still further. In examining the history of La

corruption – actions that quickly won the party widespread

Lega, I will argue that the party’s ideological development was

support and gave it a populist edge. But La Lega wasn’t just the

strategically vote maximizing: It was secessionist when it paid

ideological negative of Rome, it also offered prescriptive
solutions for Italy. By examining some of their solutions, like

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2020

1
1

The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 1 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 45

SOCIAL
SCIENCES | Political Science
Social Sciences

VOL. 1.1 | Sept. 2020

federalism, I will argue that La Lega hangs between Roger

invocation of a Northern Italian defensive alliance represents

Eatwell’s protest and economic interest theories, and that the

two important seeds of La Lega’s thought. First, is the point of

party can best be described as radical ethno-regionalist and

regionalism. The pact between these Northern Italian city states

populist.iv

had nothing to do with the concept of a Nation State. On the

Finally, this paper will examine how globalization is putting

contrary, the Lombard League was aimed at self-preservation

pressure on La Lega’s ideology. Within Italy, workers are no

for their own city states much more than they were aimed at the

longer split between Communist and Centrist parties as they

protection of “Italy,” or “Italianicity.” In the late ’80s, La Lega

were after the Second World War.v Now, Italian workers are

would adopt the same rhetoric of undermining the Nation State,

mainly split between small business owners and large corporate

claiming that regional identities were far more important. The

industrial workers. The former group advocates for regional

second point is that the pact represents the ideal centrality of

isolationism, fearing that globalization will cause them to go out

government. The city states of the Lombard League formed a

of business. But the latter group argues for a more centralized

joint organization to provide collective military defense, and to

government to ensure that Italian corporate industries can

protect against foreign invaders. All other powers were left to

remain economically competitive in the global market. Both

the autonomous city states. Bossi’s Lega would argue for a

groups are traditional sources of La Lega support, and this

similar level of devolution, leaving to the central Italian

section argues that the party has ideologically dodged the issue,

government only the “indispensable: foreigners, defense, and

turning instead to the immigrant threat and anti-EU rhetoric to

currency.”viii

unify these two constituencies.

To develop a political program worthy of such a
mythology, Bossi brought in a firebrand Professor of Political
Science, Gianfranco Miglio, who argued that the modern

HISTORY

conception of the Nation State was a throwback to authoritarian
In 1985, a new party appeared on local election ballots

absolutist regimes, and was therefore wholly “fictitious,”

in the wealthy Northern Italian city, Varese. The group went by

(Miglio 1991, 140). Miglio laid the groundwork for an early

La Lega Autonoma Lombarda, and it racked in 2.5% of the vote

comprehensive ideology for the budding party arguing that: “I

and a provincial council seat to boot.vi La Lega Lombarda, to

came to the conclusion that, as far as ‘Nations’ go, ‘large

which its name was shortened a year later, became so successful

nations’ don’t exist: the more they want to extend the confines

by its ability to invoke a specific catalogue of regional

of a presumed ethnic homogeneity, the more they end up

mythology, and by capitalizing on the governmental

distancing themselves from their authentic ethnic roots. If those

mismanagement in Rome. When Umberto Bossi founded La

roots are strong, they necessitate a nation of modest

Lega Lombarda, he envisioned the party as the modern political

dimensions,” (Miglio 1991, 140). The upshot of Miglio’s

heir to the 12th century Lombard League, a medieval alliance of

philosophy is that the concept of “Italy,” as a modern Nation

Northern Italian city states that banded together in order to

State was not only arbitrary, but actually ethnically

protect Italy from the threat of conquest by Holy Roman

disingenuous. The more “spontaneous (and true)” nations, were

vii

Emperor, Frederick I.

Eight centuries later, the geographical

those “held together not by grand rulers, or by ideals, but by a

appeal of La Lega is still largely focused in the North,

tiny net of numerous affinities, and by ritualized daily habits,”

resembling the territory of the medieval Lombard League. The

(Miglio 1991, 141). The key implication here is that the idea of
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a state is only legitimate if it caters to its citizens’ “authentic

21st century, it ultimately became time to pivot ideologically to

ethnic roots.” La Lega would come to claim that all Italians from

stay afloat. Shifts in radical party ideology typically occur in

the South, and particularly from Sicily, were ethnically different

response to a period of party entrenchment. As La Lega

and thus should be part of a different State.ix Of course, La Lega

politicians got more experience governing in parliament, they

never specified what specifically differentiates the ethnicity of

had to make concessions to establishment parties – like Silvio

a Sicilian from that of a Milanese. Nevertheless, the philosophy

Berlusconi’s Fratelli d’Italia – in order to remain respected as

that Miglio planted took root, and La Lega soon began arguing

serious parliamentary players. These concessions may have

for the secession of Northern Italy from the rest of the peninsula.

helped La Lega govern, but they directly contradicted the

They called their state “La Padania,” and it covered all

populist rhetoric the party was feeding its voters: that the elites

the territory north of the Po river. Bossi had to carefully step

in Rome were untrustworthy and out of touch with the needs of

around all explicit talk of secession at his rallies to avoid being

“real” Italians. This phenomenon is called inclusion-

arrested, but in the early ’90s,

moderation, and it stipulates that once

when Italy’s massive crackdown

elected, right-wing populist parties

on political corruption known as
Tangentopoli began, La Lega
emerged as a country favorite, and
Bossi threw caution to the wind. At
the culmination of a rally in Venice

“For all its xenophobic
rhetoric, La Lega was
giving voice to a real anger
that regular Italians had.”

temper

their

“cooperation

radicalism
with

since,

[mainstream]

parties is their most likely ticket into”
a coalition (Akkerman et al. 2016, 4).
The paradox radical-right wing parties

in 1996, Bossi declared that

generally face is that their electoral

Padania was seceding from the rest

appeal is directly proportional to their

of Italy: “the Italian state has constrained, by deceit, the people

anti-establishment bent, but the more anti-establishment parties

of Padania to succumb to systematic exploitation of their

are, the less effectively they can enter government and broker

economic resources, finances, and products of their everyday

with other political factions to deliver on their promises. This

work only to squander it all on welfare programs, clientelism,

problem isn’t unique to La Lega, either. Parties like France’s

and the mafia of the south,” (Bossi 1996, 1). Padania didn’t end

Front National, Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland, and the

up seceding, but the political crisis that followed Bossi’s

Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, are all faced with competing

declaration led to a watershed moment in Italian politics: for all

incentives: To radicalize, and thus maximize votes, or to

its xenophobic rhetoric, La Lega was giving voice to a real anger

compromise, and thus maximize policy influence.

that regular Italians had.

Nevertheless, once La Lega signaled that it was open to

According to a poll in 2010 (fourteen years after

compromise with mainstream parties, its secession narrative

Bossi’s declaration of secession), 35% of Italians favored

went out of vogue. And so, when Salvini took over as chairman

secession (61% of Northern Italians did), and 58% of Italians

of the party in 2013, he formally abandoned all appeals to the

favored federalism.x La Lega adapted to this change. Instead of

mythical Padania, and gave up secession, too. Instead, he

pushing for secession, Bossi began pushing more strongly for

substituted federalism for anti-immigrant rhetoric, and turned

federalist reforms, getting the Bassani laws passed as a result.

La Lega’s appeal from localism into nationalism. La Lega had

But as La Lega saw less and less of the national vote in the early

always asserted that the unique Padanian ethnicity merited
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separation from the South of Italy. But with increased

Lombardy, were deeply discontented with Rome’s fiscal

globalization, and refugee influxes, La Lega had to change its

management and wanted to clean house. That discontent at

in-group. Under Salvini, La Lega asserted that the Italian Nation

governmental corruption, as well as a healthy prejudice against

State, and “Italian-ness” had to be protected from foreigners.

Italy’s Mezzogiorno region, provided fertile ground for La

The strategy paid off because in the 2019 European Parliament

Lega’s populist ideology to take root. La Lega had risen to the

election, La Lega won 34% of the national vote – a landslide.xi

scene fashioning itself as “the scourge of the degenerative

The upshot is that La Lega went where the votes were. When it

practices of the political élite,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 18). And

was politically expedient to be secessionist, they were, and

now, with the indictment of so many politicians, La Lega’s

when they had to embrace the protection of the Italian Nation

charges of rampant clientelism and irresponsible spending were

State in order to appeal to more people, they did so as well. In

brought to bear. La Lega seized on its electoral surge of 1996 to

such a sense, La Lega is a vote maximizing party that is

join a coalition government with Silvio Berlusconi, and push

ideologically flexible if there is enough electoral clout at stake.

unrelentingly for federalism. Bossi’s party wanted what Miglio
described as the “authentic,” “small,” states that had more fiscal

IDEOLOGY

autonomy and would be able to make their own regional laws.
But this ideological commitment to federalism was really a

The protest thesis in Roger Eatwell’s Ten Theories of

smoke screen over the deeper distaste with the fact that the

the Extreme Right, explains parties that are a “negative attack

North ended up footing the bill for the South’s welfare

on the political establishment,” “lack any serious ideology,” and

assistance – a distaste much more in line with Eatwell’s

are, “vehicles for expressing discontent with the mainstream

economic interest thesis.xiv Eugenio Scalfari, the founder of the

parties,” (Eatwell 2003, 48). Although La Lega certainly began

Italian newspaper, La Repubblica, described just this when he

with significant protest rhetoric, it also offered concrete policy

said that the “‘desire for autonomy’” comes from this sentiment:

prescriptions and reforms which move it beyond an exclusively

“‘we’re rich because of our merits, hence we want to govern

protest category. While Eatwell’s protest thesis defines parties

ourselves alone,’” (Villone 2019, 10). Thus, La Lega’s

as non-ideological, Bossi describes La Lega as “post-

ideology, if nominally committed to federalism, was really

ideological,” that is, not confined by traditional partisan

coded with a deep ethno-regionalism that fueled resentment

xii

doctrines.

But even as the party has evolved, La Lega has

against the Central Italian State. That resentment is best

always been anti-statist. This anti-statism explains both why La

summed up by La Lega’s nickname for Rome: Roma Ladrona

Lega rose to the political scene so strongly in the early ’90s, and

(Rome, the monstrous thief).

how La Lega has been able to sustain itself in more recent years.

The protest element was “clearly important in the initial

The Tangentopoli scandal in 1992 ideologically

rise of La Lega, [but it] does not explain the party’s continued

validated La Lega.xiii As historian Paul Ginsborg notes, “by

success,” (Zasove 2011, 41). Although ethno-regionalist by

1985, the Italian public debt reached 84.6% of the country’s

design, La Lega sustained itself by a populist anti-statism that

GDP… historic inefficiency and waste in the public sector had

capitalized on a “hostility to the welfare state and to a

joined with increased spending on welfare… to produce a

multicultural society,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 47). The difference

spiraling deficit,” (Ginsborg 2003, 409). Italian voters,

now, as before, is one of scale. La Lega was against the Italian

particularly in the Northern industrial powerhouse region of

Nation State when it was predominantly a protest party, but in
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the 21st century, La Lega has expanded its notion of “the State”

globalization, and want to compete on the international scene.

to include supranational organizations like the European Union.

Because of these different reactions to globalization, both

Indeed, since the Dublin Agreement – which said, among other

classes have distinct views of the role of the State. The small

things, that refugees had to be kept at their ports of entry –

business owner, “demands more fiscal and political autonomy,”

Brussels has been the perfect scapegoat for La Lega. La Lega

while larger corporate leaders are, “looking for a more central,

has

and

statist approach to contending with other European powers. One

“displacement,” of Italians and turned the massive influx of

is parochial, the other is globalized,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 149).

refugees into a narrative of EU-sanctioned invasion.xv

In the midst of this crossfire, La Lega has to carry out a delicate

strategically

weaponized

the

“insecurity,”

In both cases, La Lega is characterized by an anti-

balancing act if it wants to hold on to as many of its supporters

statism resulting from economic anger at subsidizing the South,

as possible. The central dilemma of La Lega’s position in the

and anger at the European Union for saddling Italy with

globalized world is that, for the first time, it cannot pivot

hundreds of thousands of refugees. In such a sense, La Lega falls

exclusively to either the global defense or to the regional

between Eatwell’s protest and economic interest theories. To

defense. The paradox can best be summed up by: “Today [La

this model, I argue that the labels “ethno-regionalist” and

Lega] seems reduced to defending the local against both the

“populist” should be added because of the party’s hatred of the

national and the global,” (Bull & Gilbert 2001, 148).

South, and because of its anti-immigrant xenophobia.

Instead of addressing the issue head on, La Lega has turned to
the immigrant threat to unite both the small business owner and

GLOBALIZATION

the corporate business man. By closing the Italian ports to
African migrant ships last summer, for example, Salvini

I have argued that La Lega is essentially vote maximizing. It

redirected the economic anxieties that both business classes feel

adapts its ideology if it is politically expedient to do so, and it

onto the foreign “other.” This out-group scapegoating is a

keeps its ideology if it is not. But the forces of globalization are

particularly effective strategy from the radical right playbook,

placing enormous pressure on La Lega’s ideologically adaptive

and allows La Lega to avoid addressing the logical

strategy. Here, I argue that La Lega dodges the problem of

inconsistencies inherent in its localist ideology.

economic globalization, opting instead, to unite its voting base
along a class-cutting cleavage: the immigrant threat.
The anxiety of an increasingly globalized world affects
the many cross sections of La Lega’s voting base differently.
Broadly speaking, La Lega’s supporters are either petit
bourgeoise – small business owners in northern Alpine cities –
or corporate industrialists – business tycoons and leaders of
international firms. These two classes have distinct responses to
globalization: the small business owners fear that international
corporations will price gauge, driving them out of business,
while the corporate tycoons welcome the challenge of

CONCLUSION
By examining the history of La Lega, I argue that the party was
motivated by a mix of discontent with the political
establishment of Rome, and by the economic frustration of
having to fund a welfare state for the South of Italy. Those
frustrations and discontents have morphed over the years, and
the party’s platform has followed suit. Indeed, the party of Bossi
advocated for secession of the mythical Padania from the rest of
Italy, and now the party of Salvini has floated the idea of
“Italexit,” from the EU. The upshot is that for all of La Lega’s

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2020

5
5

The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 1 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 45

SOCIAL
SCIENCES | Political Science
Social Sciences

VOL. 1.1 | Sept. 2020

political adaptations, there has been a persistent undercurrent of
anti-statism, ethno-regionalism, and neoliberal economics.
Furthermore, globalization has placed tremendous
pressure on La Lega in terms of placating a deeply divided
electoral base. La Lega established itself as a formidable
ideological opponent on the Italian political scene in the ’80s,
and has since lost the moral high ground. Primarily concerned
with maximizing votes, La Lega has turned to anti-EU
sentiment and anti-immigrant rhetoric to unite its voting base.
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